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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CITATION
PRESERVING ISSUE FOR APPEAL
This appeal from an order entered February 18, 2003 granting Appellee Peterson's
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE R. 113.
(This appeal was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court by ordered dated December 30,
2002. R. 106.)
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether Brown's defective appeal should be dismissed because he applies the

incorrect standard of review on appeal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

2.

Whether the lower court properly dismissed Appellant's defective pleadings

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

on the grounds that the

allegations in the complaint failed to state any claim against Appellee Robert Peterson.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellee, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), moved below under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the complaint (the "Complaint") of
appellant Alan Brown, M.D. ("Appellant or Dr. Brown") on the grounds that the allegations
in the Complaint failed to state a claim against Appellee. R. at 49.

1.

PROCEDURAL DEFECTS AND INCORRECT STANDARD OF
REVIEW IN BROWN'S BRIEF

Brown's brief dated May 19, 2004 (the "Brief) constitutes Brown's second failed
attempt to comply with this Court's rules. By Order dated May 5,2004 (the "Order"), this

Court previously found that Brown's original brief, dated February 12,2004 (the "Original
Brief) failed to comply with the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 and 11, but permitted
Brown to file a compliant brief within 30 days of the Order. Although the some of the
deficiencies of the Original Brief were remedied through the Brief, the Brief remains
defective and inadequate because it raises factual contentions that are not supported by the
record below.
Brown claims that in this appeal that "[appellee's] motion to dismiss for failure of the
pleading [sic] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted shall be treated as one for
summaryjudgment." Appellant's Brief at 1. Citing his memoranda filed to oppose Peterson's
Motion to Dismiss, Brown devotes his brief and argument to the standard for summary
judgment rather than that applicable to a motion to dismiss repeatedly referencing
memoranda rather than his complaint. Appellant's Brief at 1. Despite prior opportunities to
apply the correct standard of appeal1, Brown stubbornly insists that the appeal of the Order
Granting Peterson's Motion to Dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment.
Brown tries to convert this appeal to a factual dispute by citing to arguments in his
memoranda below rather than focusing on his dismissed complaint. His arguments on appeal
rely on allegations and documents not part of his complaint and which are only found in
unsubstantianted and inadmissible documents and arguments made in memoranda.
The lower court never looked outside the pleadings, nor should it have, and this appeal
may not now be converted to an appeal of a non-existent summary judgment. Brown cannot
1

In Peterson's Motion to Strike Appellant's Brief and in Brown's first Appellee's
Brief, Peterson noted that Brown had applied the incorrect standard of review.
2

now make this appeal a hearing on a non-existent motion for summary judgment by
incorporating documents to which he referred in memoranda below to contest phantom facts
and allegations not found in his complaint.
Accordingly, having briefed and argued facts not on the record, having applied the
incorrect legal standard, and by incorporating exhibits and "facts" never before the lower
court and not pertinent to his appeal, the lower court's order granting Brown's Motion to
Dismiss should be upheld.
2.

BROWN'S CLAIMS AGAINST PETERSON ON APPEAL

Dr. Brown's claims below arose when he couldn't use an "optimal" or "superior"
microscope he preferred. R. at 21- 31. His complaint recites that "[Brown] was of the
opinion that in the interests of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical assistant
and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was optimal." R. 29. Nonetheless, because
Appellant could not use a "newer" arguably better microscope, the two surgeons against
whom the action was filed somehow intended to interfere with his economic relations. R 21,
22.
Although the microscopes at issue are considered by the hospital as capital equipment,
R. 22, Brown filed a civil action against two surgeons, one appellee Dr. Robert Peterson,
claiming "actual damages" of $ 18,296.50, for unspecified economic injury, punitive damages
and injunctive relief claiming a conspiracy to deny him use of a particular microscope. R. 20,
21, 22, and 33.

3

Having dismissed the other surgeon below, Brown doggedly pursues this appeal only
against Peterson because he once referred to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R.26. There is
nothing more in Brown's complaint about Peterson. Other than the solitary reference as
"banned surgeon" Brown's complaint is silent how or when Peterson actually, if ever,
deprived or otherwise prevented Peterson from using any microscope. Claiming that he
couldn't use the preferred microscope, Brown claims that Dr. Peterson somehow "intended"
to interfere with Appellant's prospective economic relations and therefore damaged Brown.
R.31.
Because Brown makes no allegation that Peterson actually prevented Brown from
using any microscope, Brown's complaint is defective, stated no claim against Peterson and
was properly dismissed by the lower court. In his complaint, Brown cryptically alleged that
the two physician-defendants in the lower court, two neurological surgeons, "have engaged
in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly intimidating others through actions
and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with [Brown's] economic relations by
wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper purpose and
through improper means causing injury to [Brown.]" R. 31
Referring to the now-dismissed Dr. Reichmann against whom Brown directed
substantially all his allegations below, Brown claimed that "even if the defendant's [sic] acts
were not for the purpose of interfering with the [Brown's] economic relations . . . the
interference was intentional." R. 32.

4

Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings,
Brown alleged below that because he was not able to use a particular microscope in surgery,
he has been damaged because he "felt uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his
patient and canceled the procedure." R. at 12. Brown never alleges how appellee Peterson
prevented such use other than to refer to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R. at 26.
Because Brown stated no claim against Peterson in his complaint, the lower court
granted Peterson's Motion to Dismiss. R. 113. Fatal there and to this appeal is the absence
of any allegation against Peterson of how he deprived or prevented Brown from using an
"optimal" microscope or otherwise interfered with Brown's prospective economic relations.
Also fatal to his claims below is Brown's admission that another microscope, although
allegedly "inferior," was available for his use during surgery. R. 21, 22, 23 and 29.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS AND UNSUBSTANTIATED EXHIBITS
OUTSIDE THE COMPLAINT CANNOT CURE OR AMEND
THE DEFECT'S IN BROWN'S COMPLAINT
In a sly attempt to support his defective complaint below, Brown relies on "facts"
which are not supported by the record and were not part of the complaint below. Brown now
cites as "facts" and the "record," statements and allegations made in his memoranda
opposing Peterson's Motion to Dismiss below. By relying to statements in his memoranda
below, Brown attempts to establish "facts" and other "allegations" which are not part of
Brown's defective complaint on which this appeal must focus.
Because this is an appeal of an order granting amotion dismissing Brown's complaint
for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, there is only one relevant fact:
What is in the complaint? See Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT
9, f 30, 70 P. 2d 17 (noting in context of review of motion to dismiss that"' we consider only
the legal sufficiency of the complaint'") quoting Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Prop.
&Cas.Ins.Co.. 890 P.2d 1029,1030 (Utah 1995); Clark v. Deloitte & Touche. 2001 UT 90,
Tf 14,34 P.3d 209 (same). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, this Court "accept[s]
the factual allegations in the complaint as true." Krouse v. Bowen 2001 UT 28, f 2,20 P.3d
895; see also Pendleton v. Utah State Ban 2000 UT 96,%5, 16 P.3d 1230 (same). Factual
allegations outside the purview of the complaint are at best irrelevant in an appeal of the

6

dismissal of a complaint. The only relevant "facts" to this appeal are dictated solely by
Brown's complaint below.
Brown's brief contains numerous "allegations" or citations not found in Brown's
complaint. To cite only a few examples:
Brief at 3: "The Defendants/Appellees are also partners acting under the
business name Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C." This statement can be found
in the Memorandum of Law R. 64), but does not appear to be in the
corresponding portion of the complaint R. 20).
Brief at 4: "The Defendants/Appellees have never disputed that the Leica and
the newer Zeiss microscopes are superior in quality to the older Zeiss." This
statement can be found in the Memorandum of Law R. 65), but does not
appear to be in the corresponding portion of the complaint R. 21).
Brief at 6: "The letter also states that '[t]he neurosurgeons have met in this
regard and the opinions are unanimous.'" This statement can be found in the
Memorandum of Law R. 67), but does not appear to be in the corresponding
portion of the complaint R. 25).
Brief at 7:

"This was a direct and intentional attempt to keep the

Plaintiff/Appellant from rightfully using this equipment." This statement is
similar to a statement in the Memorandum of Law R. 69), but a different
statement is found in the complaint R. 28).

7

Brief at 7: "The Plaintiff7Appellees claimed that these statements were
fraudulent." This statement is similar to a statement in the Memorandum of
Law R. 74), but does not appear to be in the corresponding portion of the
complaint R. 28).
This Court and Peterson are left to sort out the actual statements in Brown's complaint
from his later embellishments. It is Brown's responsibility to marshall the evidence (which
would be found in the complaint itself) and present it to this Court. It is not the responsibility
of the Court or the parties to marshall the evidence for Brown's benefit or address issues
never before the lower court. Brown's reliance on the Memorandum of Law for factual
matters which are not in the complaint only illustrates why his complaint was dismissed
below for failing to state a claim against Peterson. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,110910 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (declining to consider merits of appeal where brief "sets forth little
legal analysis on the issue presented, does not specifically discuss how the trial court erred,
does not even attempt to marshal the evidence, and presents no citations to the record.");
Koulisv. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182,1184-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (disregarding brief
and assuming correctness ofjudgment below where brief "contains no citations to the record
for factual allegations other than several general references to the lease agreements."); State
v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) (assuming correctness ofjudgment below where brief
"failed to refer to any portion of the record that factually supports" contentions on appeal).

8

POINT II
BROWN'S CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE TORT OF "INTENT" TO INTERFERE
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent' to interfere with prospective economic
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations.
Appellee concedes that even though Appellee may not have actually interfered with
Appellee's prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional R at 32, (f 5).
Having conceded that there was no actual interference with Appellee's actual economic
relations, under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom.
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and was properly dismissed by
the lower court.
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, the Utah Supreme Court held that a
defendant is liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves
"(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential
economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury
to the plaintiff.11 A party is subject to liability for an intentional interference with present
contractual relations if he intentionally and improperly causes one of the parties not to
perform the contract Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979). St. Benedict's
Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991).
Conspicuous by its absence in Appellee's complaint is any factual allegation that Dr.
Peterson intentionally or otherwise unlawfully actually prevented Brown from performing
9

the surgery causedBrown not to perform any contract or otherwise prevented interfered with
any economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St. Benedict's
Development Company Co. Distilled to its essence, the sole allegation on which Brown rests
his entire case against Dr. Peterson was that he commented to a colleague that Brown was
a "banned surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. R. at 26. Brown admits that
after this single comment on September 17,2002, that "from October 1 st, 2001 until July 2nd,
2002," he utilized "the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." R.28.
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson
committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Brown. There is
simply no allegation in the Complaint that Dr. Peterson actually interfered with any contract
or economic relationship. Instead, the allegations were against Dr. Reichman, dismissed
below, not Dr. Peterson. R. 22 - 24; 29 -32. Further, Brown requested "additional damages
. . . as a result of the Defendant's [sic] continued unlawful actions and omission," . . . not
because of any acts of the defendants (plural) (emphasis supplied.) R. 14, line 9, 12. ("Even
if the Defendant's acts . . . . ")(emphasis supplied).
Brown, a surgeon, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or
whether patients were ill-served by anything that Appellee did or didn't do.2 As trite as it may

2

Brown alleges that on July 2, 2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon"
comment, he "felt uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and
canceled the procedure." R. 30. Brown does not allege whether this alleged cancellation
of surgery caused any damages, whether the procedure was later rescheduled nor does he
allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person) improperly interfered with the surgical
procedure. Another microscope was available for the surgery Brown cancelled. R. 29.
10

seem, Brown does not have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any
particular microscope. R. 3 - 4. Rather, he assumes that as a surgeon at a hospital if he is not
allowed to use any microscope of his choosing he is damaged. R. 10 -12. Although Brown
corresponded with various other physicians about his desire to use a particular microscope,
among all the physicians at the hospital he targeted only two and pursues this appeal against
only one surgeon, because that surgeon referred to Brown as a "banned surgeon." R. 5 - 1 1 .
Appellee recites in his Complaint that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute
but that there has been "no written or verbal response[s]" to his letter. R. 9. Because Dr.
Reichmann, not appellee Dr. Peterson, did not have the "authority to restrict access to the
microscope," Brown brought his action against Dr. Reichman. R. 12.
Brown's Complaint is also defective and was properly dismissed below because he
has no standing to bring claims against "[defendants" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-50 l(c)(i). R 31. Proceedings for alleged unprofessional or
unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing under Chapter 58 of the UTAH CODE. Brown had no standing to allege violations
of Utah law in the action below and does not address his lack of standing in his appeal.
The same omissions, deficiencies and errors fatal to Brown's action below carry over
to this appeal. Brown ignores clear precedent and applicable procedure attaching to his brief
correspondence and other documents which are not part of the record and have no place in
this appeal and cannot be used to cure or now amend the Complaint the lower court
dismissed because of its defects.

11

CONCLUSION
The lower court properly dismissed Dr. Brown's civil action below. A solitary
reference to Brown as a "banned surgeon" does not rise to the level of tortious interference
of economic relations as Brown contends. With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating
what actions may be lawfully addressed in this state's courts, Brown's allegations below
were and remain defective as a matter law and stated no claim against Dr. Peterson. Because
Brown's pleadings below and brief on appeal fail to satisfy the most fundamental
requirements of Utah law, his Complaint and this appeal fall short of stating any claim for
tortious interference with economic relations against Dr. Peterson.
Because no actionable claim was plead against Dr. Peterson below and because Brown
brief is defective, the record replete with inadmissible and unfounded references, the Order
of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing Brown's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) may be
properly and lawfully upheld.
Respectfully submitted 9th day of August, 2004.
PARSONSJ^mGH0RN HARRIS, P . C ^ < ?

/ HaWcl L. Reiser
Attorneys for Appellee - Dr. Robert Peterson
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ADDENDUM 1
Plaintiff/Appellant's Amended Complaint and Jury Demand. R. 19-36

I~

Alan B. Brown (#7693)
Attorney, acting for himself
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
(801) 541-5492
(801) 964-3436 fax

CO

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff
v.
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert
Peterson, M.D.

Case No.

Defendants
Judge

Pursuant to URCP Rule 15(a), Plaintiff requests the Court
accept this Amended Complaint and Jury Demand.

The

amendment consists of changing Claim (1) to read: "From May
23rd, 2001 through the present, Defendants have used
unprofessional and unethical conduct with the intent to
interfere with the economic relations of the Plaintiff in
violation of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501(2) (b), and
58-67-501(1) (c) (i)

1

r j

Background:
(1)

The Defendants are both licensed physicians

specializing in the practice of neurosurgery and they
both maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant, Dr. Mark Reichman,

is the Chief of the Neurosurgery Division at LDS
Hospital.

(2)

The Plaintiff is a licensed physician specializing

in orthopedic surgery and who also maintains active
staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
(3)

In the normal course of their respective

businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are
competitors for certain types of surgical patients
seeking treatment for spinal disorders.
(4)

The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC

Health Plans.

This contract requires that the

Plaintiff maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain
Health Care facility.

The Plaintiff has continued to

2

maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Plaintiff is a Board

certified orthopedic surgeon and is fellowship trained
in spine surgery.
)

At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically

utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures
and neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss
surgical microscope, va Leica surgical microscope, and
an older model Zeiss surgical microscope.

At LDS

hospital, the operating rooms are numbered sequentially
for identification.

The newer Zeiss and the Leica

microscope are typically stored and ready for use in
operating room number Four and operating room number
Five.

These two microscopes are equipped so that a

surgical assistant has a binocular head directly across
from the operating surgeon allowing him to have
essentially the same surgical perspective as the
operating surgeon.

This provides a measure of

increased safety for the patient and also allows a more
comfortable environment for the operative assistant.
These two microscopes are also equipped with superior

3

optics and other features allowing a higher quality
view and greater ease and flexibility for the surgeon
and assistant during a surgical procedure.

The older

model Zeiss does not have these features and instead
has an offset opposing headpiece that forces the
assistant to be in an awkward position when she is
assisting and does not allow for the same surgical
perspective as the operating surgeon.

It is generally

a far inferior piece of equipment.
(6)

The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and

utilized the operative microscopes for certain
procedures when they were available in the normal
course of his practice.

These microscopes are owned by

the hospital as capital equipment.

On May 23rd, 2001

the plaintiff had a surgical case scheduled in the LDS
operating room.

The Plaintiff's surgical case was

scheduled in an operating room not typically utilized
by the neurosurgical service.

On that date there was a

surgical microscope appropriate for the Plaintiff's
needs physically located in another operating room
where one of the defendants, Dr. Mark Reichman, was

4

v^

performing a neurosurgical procedure.

Dr. Reichman was

not using a microscope for the particular procedure he
was performing. The Plaintiff asked Dr. Reichman if he
was using the microscope in that operating room and if
not, would he mind if the microscope was moved to
another room so that the Plaintiff could use it. The
microscopes are designed to be easily and safely moved
from one place to another.

Dr. Reichman asserted that

the microscope was for neurosurgical procedures only.
The Plaintiff pointed out that he wanted to use the
microscope for a cervical spine fusion, a procedure
commonly done as a neurosurgical procedure by
neurosurgeons.

Dr. Reichman then took the position

that he had a proprietary interest in the microscope
and that the microscope in the room he was operating in
was for use by neurosurgeons only.

He further asserted

that use by non-neurosurgeons would lead to damage of
the equipment and he suggested that the plaintiff buy
his own microscope.
)

On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff sent a letter to

Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of the operative

5

microscope for certain procedures was in the interests
of delivering the highest possible patient care and
that it was also important for patient safety. The
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so.
The letter requested Dr. Reichman to change his
position as to who he thought could appropriately u&e
this equipment.
(8)

Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this

request and instead asserted to the operating room
staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of
the surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the
neurosurgery division and that the Plaintiff was
forbidden to use them.
(9)

Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty,

the Chief of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact
owned and controlled the operating room equipment at
LDS Hospital.

On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with

Dr. Doty to discuss the issue.

At this meeting Dr.

Doty confirmed that the surgical microscopes in the LDS
Hospital operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and
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he indicated and that it would be acceptable and
appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the surgical
microscopes.
(10)

Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash,

Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at
LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery
department is very busy and cannot provide adequate
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if
the microscopes are not available or being used by
other services."

He went on to state that the

neurosurgeons would allow the Plaintiff the use of the
older Zeiss microscope.

He also went on to state that

none of the neurosurgeons at LDS Hospital have any
problem using this older Zeiss microscope when the
newer Zeiss or Leica microscopes were not available.
(11)

On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting

in the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a
spinal surgery operation in operating room Five.
Plaintiff was specifically waiting for Defendant Dr.
Robert G. Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in
that room.

After Dr. Peterson finished his case he
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came into the lounge where the Plaintiff, a physicians
assistant, and a otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon who
Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting.

Dr.

Peterson had never met the Plaintiff before this and
was therefore unaware of who he was.
began talking to the ENT surgeon.

Dr. Peterson

He wanted to know if

the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for his case. He
encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the microscope from
room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff,
who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure in
Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not
have it available for his case.

He went on to state

that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room
Five.

The Plaintiff overheard this and responded by

going over to the Defendant and politely stating that
he would like to introduce himself and that he was
"Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
(12)

On October 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff wrote to Dr.

Doty agreeing to follow Dr. Reichman's August 1st, 2001
suggestion that the Plaintiff use the older Zeiss but
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contingent on some modifications being made.

These

modifications consisted of replacing the offset
assistant's head with an opposing head and upgrading
some of the other features and optics.

These

modifications could be done if the hospital was willing
to expend the money for those modifications.

The

Plaintiff suggested that it was reasonable for him to
continue to use the new Zeiss and the Leica microscopes
until the appropriate modifications were made.
Plaintiff also agreed that his use would only be when
these microscopes were not being utilized by the
neurosurgery service and therefore there would be no
conflict or patient safety issue. Additionally, the
Plaintiff documented in this letter to Dr. Doty the
incident with Dr. Peterson on September 17th. The
Plaintiff pointed out that it seemed that the
neurosurgery service was more interested in interfering
with the Plaintiff's practice than from keeping all
other services from using the microscopes as had been
previously suggested by the Defendants.

There was no

written or verbal response to this letter.
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(13)

From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the

Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems.

Also during this time

period Dr. Reichman continued to assert to the
operating room staff that he had the authority to
restrict access to the surgical microscopes in an
attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
(14)

On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to

Dr. Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Ziess and/or the Leica
microscope(s).

Defendants argued that as a result of

the Plaintiff's causing a "generalized disrepair" of
the microscopes, treatment of neurosurgery patients had
been compromised and operating room time and stress had
increased.

Defendants continued to maintain that they

had a right to restrict access to the microscopes
Plaintiff wanted to use.

A copy of this letter was

sent to Dr. Doty and to the Dusty Clegg, R.N.,
Department Manager for the operating rooms.
Plaintiff was not sent a copy of this letter.
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The

Plaintiff denies the truth of the allegations in this
letter and is unaware of any documentation or proof of
the allegations in this letter.
(15)

On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient

scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests
of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled
surgical assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica
microscope was optimal.

The modifications to the older

Zeiss microscope had still not been done. When the
Plaintiff came to the operating room he was told that
Defendants were insistent that he could not use the
newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes.

This was despite

the fact that at least one of these microscopes was
available for use on that day as was one of the
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was
located.

Plaintiff asked what his options were and

called Dusty Clegg to request a suggestion on how to
best handle the problem.

Dusty Clegg recommended that

Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was
unproductive to call hospital administration.
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The

Plaintiff called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he
wanted to use one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman
had restricted. Dr. Reichman, without discussion,
refused to change his assertion that the Plaintiff did
not have Dr. Reichman's permission to use the
microscopes.

Plaintiff called Dr. William Hamilton,

Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central Region, to
explain the situation in brief.

Dr. Hamilton, after

some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the
microscope in question.

Plaintiff felt uncomfortable

using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled
the procedure.
(16)

The following day the Plaintiff called Dr.

Hamilton requesting information and clarification on
what happened the previous day.

Dr. Hamilton

apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital
was dependent on the neurosurgical service to provide
level one trauma care and also that the hospital was
currently in negotiations with Dr. Reichman regarding
the issue of neurosurgical coverage for trauma.
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He at

no time stated that Dr. Reichman had *cne ^autrrroip^y^wa^
restrict access to the microscope nor did he state that
any of the allegations made by the Defendants regarding
damaged or disassembled equipment were true or even
documented.

CLAIMS
(1)

From May 23 rd , 2001 through the present,
Defendants have used unprofessional and unethical
conduct with the intent to interfere with the
economic relations of the Plaintiff in violation
of Utah Code 58-1-501(2)(a), 58-1-501(2)(b), and
58-67-501(1)(c)(i).

(2)

By misrepresenting his authority and intimidating
the Plaintiff and the LDS Hospital operating room
staff as well as hospital administrators,
defendant Dr. Mark Reichman has practiced and
attempted to practice his occupation using actions
and communications which are false, misleading,
deceptive and fraudulent in violation of Utah Code
Section 58-1-501(2)(h).

(3)

Defendants have engaged in a pattern of activity
including directly and indirectly intimidating
others through actions and/or omissions with the
intent to interfere with the Plaintiff's economic
relations by wrongfully restricting access to
essential hospital equipment for an improper
purpose and through improper means causing injury
to the Plaintiff.

(4)

The Defendant's malicious intent and unlawful
methods will not support an affirmative defense of
privilege.

(5)

Even if the Defendant's acts were not for the
purpose of interfering with the Plaintiff's
economic relations or even if the Defendants did
not desire to interfere with the Plaintiff's
economic relations, the Defendants knew that
interference was substantially certain to occur as
a result of their actions and as a necessary
consequence thereof, the interference was
intentional.

(6)

Witnesses and documents will establish clear and
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convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the Defendants are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the
rights of the Plaintiff as required for punitive
damages pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-18-

K D (a).

Demands:

(1)

Plaintiff requests relief in the amount of
$18,296.50 representing actual damages.

(2)

Plaintiff requests the Court award punitive
damages and the costs of this suit and such
further relief as the Courts sees fit.

(3)

Plaintiff requests permission to add parties and
causes of action at a later date consistent with

evidence adduced through discovery.

(4)

Plaintiff requests any additional damages accrued
as a result of the Defendant's continued unlawful
actions and omissions.

(5)

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief against
future actions and/or omissions by the Defendants
that would result in unlawful interference with
the Plaintiff's economic relations.

Dated July 29th, 2002.

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Attorney, acting for himself:
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the enclosed Amended Complaint and Request for Jury Trial this
July 29, 2002 to:
Robert Peterson, M.D.
370 9th Ave Suite 111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

Lan B. Brown

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct
copy of the enclosed Amended Complaint and Request for Jury Trial this
July 29, 2002 to:
Mark Reichman, M.D.
370 9th Ave Suite 111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

ran B. Brown

ADDENDUM 2
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for More
Definite Statement. R. 49 - 50
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I hereby certify that on August 23,2002,1 served the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT, by mailing
a true and correct copy thereof, byfirst-classUnited States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as
follows:
Alan B. Brown, M.D.
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Bruce H. Jensen
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1500
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
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Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D.
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT
PETERSON, M.D.

DEFENDANT PETERSON'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT
Civil No. 020906986
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

Defendants.

Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson") moves under Rule 12(b)(6) of the UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

to dismiss the complaint of Alan Brown, M.D. ("Dr. Brown") on the

grounds that the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim against Dr. Peterson. Alternatively,
Dr. Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

This motion is accompanied by a supporting memorandum filed concurrently with this
motion.
DATED: August 23,2002.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGH«

PETERS

Harold L. Reiser
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.

ADDENDUM 3
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss or, in the
alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement. R. 51 - 56

185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1500
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
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Attorneys for Defendant - Robert Peterson, M.D.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D.
Plaintiff,

vs.
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT
PETERSON, M.D.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
DEFENDANT PETERSON'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT
Civil No. 020906986
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

Defendant, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), has moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the Complaint of Alan Brown, M.D. ("Dr. Brown")

pro se, on the grounds that the allegations do not state a claim against him. Alternatively, Dr.
Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE.

This action arises from plaintiffs desire to use a particular microscope in a surgical
procedure. Dr. Brown seeks actual damages of $ 18,296.50 for unspecified economic injury, punitive
damages and injunctive relief.
In the Complaint, the sole allegation against Dr. Peterson is that he once referred to Dr.
Brown as a "banned surgeon", a reference to Dr. Brown's use of a particular microscope used by

surgery, Dr. Peterson Has "intended77 to interfere with Plaintiffs prospective economic relations and
somehow damaged Dr. Brown.1

Dr. Brown cryptically alleges that the Defendants, both

neurological surgeons, "have engaged in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly
intimidating others through actions and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with Plaintiffs
economic relations by wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper
purpose and through improper means causing injury to the Plaintiff/' Complaint at 13. Further,
defects in the pleadings are revealed by Dr. Brown inconsistently claiming that "even if the
Defendant's [sic] acts were not for the purpose of interfering with the Plaintiffs economic relations
. . , the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14.
Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings, Dr.
Brown complains that, because he is not able to use a particular microscope in surgery, he has been
damaged. Dr. Brown concedes that other microscopes, although allegedly "inferior" were available
for his use. Complaint at 2, 3. Nonetheless, because he could not use a particular microscope, the
defendants have intended to interfere with his economic relations.
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent* to interfere with prospective economic
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Dr.
Brown concedes that even though Dr. Brown may not have actually interfered with Dr. Brown's
prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional Complaint at 14, ^ 5. Having
conceded that there was no actual interference with Dr. Brown's actual economic relations, under

The microscopes in question are owned by the hospital as capital equipment. Complaint at 4.
2

the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and must therefore be dismissed.
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is
liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves M(l) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2)
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." A party is subject
to liability for an intentional interference with present contractual relations if he intentionally and
improperly causes one of the parties not to perform the contract. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
766 (1979). St Benedict's Development Company v. St Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 201
(Utah 1991). Conspicuous by its absence is any factual allegation that Dr. Brown intentionally or
otherwise unlawfully caused Dr. Brown to not perform any contract or otherwise interfered with any
economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St Benedict's Development
Company Co. Distilled to its essence, Dr. Peterson commented that Dr. Brown was a "banned
surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. Dr, Brown admits that after this single
comment on September 17,2002, that "from October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002, the Plaintifif
utilized the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." Complaint at 9.
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson committed
any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Dr. Brown. There is simply no allegation
in the Complaint that defendant interfered with any contract or economic relationship. Plaintiff, a
medical doctor, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or whether patients were
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ill-served by anything that defendant did or didn't do. 2 As trite as it may seem, Dr. Brown does not

have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any particular microscope. Dr.
Brown recites that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute but that there has been "no
written or verbal responsejs]" to his letter. Complaint 9. Presumably, his damages are the cost of
a new microscope. If not, then the pleadings give insufficient particularity for Dr. Brown to frame
a responsive pleading other than a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs complaint is also defective because he has no standing to bring claims under Utah
Code Ann Section 58-l-501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-501(c)(i).

Proceedings for alleged

unprofessional or unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing under Chapter 58 of the Utah Code. Plaintiff has no standing to allege
violations of Utah law in this civil action.
CONCLUSION
With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating what actions may be lawfully addressed
in this state's courts, Dr. Brown's allegations against Dr. Peterson are defective as a matter of law.
Dr. Peterson should not have to defend against such defective and trivial accusations. Plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the requirements of Utah law and accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint falls short of
stating a claim for tortious interference with economic relations and may be properly dismissed.
Without more, no claim for interference with economic relations can lie and Dr. Peterson's Motion
to Dismiss may be granted.
2

Plaintiff alleges that on July 2,2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon" comment, he "felt
uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled the procedure." Complaint
at 12. Plaintiff does not allege whether this alleged cancellation caused any damages, whether the
procedure was later rescheduled nor does he allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person)
improperly interfered with the surgical procedure.
4
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Alternatively, Dr. Brown should be required to make a more definite statement under Rule
12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE how (and if) any Defendant actually and
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations; (2) clarifying
the improper purpose or by improper means employed by any Defendant; and (3) how the Plaintiff
was injured as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. The Plaintiff should also
clarify his claims for relief which indiscriminately refer to "Defendant's" action without any
reference to a particular Defendant See, e.g., Complaint at 13. ("The Defendant's [sic] malicious
intent and unlawful methods will not support an affirmative defense of privilege.")
Plaintiffs complaint fails to give sufficient detail or notice to Dr. Peterson so he can frame
responsive pleading or craft discovery to defend against the allegations in the complaint. If the
>mplaint if not dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff should give a more definite statement
to the claims he makes against Dr. Peterson.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2002.
PARSONS, DAV^S, KINGHORN^ PETERS

Bv: /{y^^

^

_ L _

Ha&ld L. Reiser
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.
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CERTBFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 23, 2002, I served the foregoing, MEMORANDUM
ORTING MOTION TO DISMISS ORINTHE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FORMORE
NITE STATEMENT, by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, byfirst-classUnited States
>ostage prepaid and addressed as follows:
Alan B. Brown, M.D.
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Bruce H. Jensen
WILLIAMS & HUNT

257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM 4
Plaintiff7Appellant's Memorandum . . . Against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
Defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement. R 61 - 83
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Alan B. Brown (#7693)
Attorney, acting for himself
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
(801) 541-5492
(801) 964-3436 fax
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG 2 9 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.

Memorandum Supporting Default
Entry and Against Defendant's

Plaintiff
v.

Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's

Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert

Motion for a More Definite Statement

Peterson, M.D.
Case No. 020906986

Defendants

The Honorable Judge Stephen L.
Henriod

Plaintiff had a constable properly serve the Defendant with
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons on July 23rd, 2002.

On

August 15th, 2002 Defendant Robert Peterson had still failed
to answer and so Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment
pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1).

On August 23rd, 2002 Defendant

moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Claim pursuant to URCP 12(b)(6)
on the grounds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not state

1

a Claim.

In the alternative, Defendant made a Motion for a

More Definite Statement.

I.

Defendant' s Motion is Barred as Defendant Has Failed
to Plead as Required by URCP 12 (a)

A.

FACTS
Defendants Dr. Mark Reichman and Dr. Robert Peterson

were personally served by a constable on July 23rd, 2001 with
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons as required under URCP 4.
Proof of Service, a copy of the Claim and Ten Day Summons has
been filed with the Court as required under URCP 3(a). An
Amended Complaint was filed with the Court and served upon
the Defendants on August 29th, 2002.

Robert Peterson, M.D.

failed to plead or otherwise defend as required by URCP 12(a)
until after August 16th, 2002.

Pursuant-to URCP 55(a) (1),

Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment against defendant Dr.
Robert Peterson on August 15th.

B.

ISSUE
URCP 60(b) provides in part that on motion and upon

such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
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justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.

Defendant Robert Peterson

discussed the Complaint with his partner and co-defendant
Mark Reichman.

Dr. Reichman emphasized to Dr. Peterson that

they needed separate counsel and that the Complaint needed
to be answered.

Dr. Peterson is a Board certified

Neurosurgeon with extensive education and training.
Defendant Peterson's failure to plead in a timely manner
indicates indifference to the legal process and therefore

does not entitle him to relief under URCP 60(b).

II.

Plaintiff's Response to Request for a More Definite
Statement and Defense that His Complaint States a
Claim for which Relief Could be Granted.

A.

FACTS:
The Defendants are both licensed physicians

specializing in the practice of neurosurgery.

Both

Defendants maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendants are also partners

acting under the business name Neurosurgical Associates,
L.L.C.

Defendant Dr. Mark Reichman, is the Chief of the

Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital.

The Plaintiff is a

licensed physician specializing in orthopedic surgery and
who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the normal course of their

respective businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are
competitors for certain types of surgical patients seeking
treatment for spinal disorders.
The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC

A

Health Plans.

This contract requires that the Plaintiff

maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain Health Care
facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC
Health Plan medical insurance be treated at an IHC
contracted hospital such as LDS Hospital.

The contract

between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff also provides
generally that the Plaintiff will provide surgical services
for IHC Health Plans' beneficiaries in exchange for IHC
Health Plans paying for those services.

The Plaintiff has

continued to maintain active staff privileges at LDS
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures and
neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss surgical
microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model
Zeiss surgical microscope.

The Defendant's have never

disputed that the Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are
superior in quality to the older Zeiss.

These superior

quality makes certain surgical procedures safer for the
patients and more comfortable for the surgeon and the
surgical assistant.
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The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and
utilized the operative microscopes for certain procedures
when they were available in the normal course of his
practice.

These microscopes are owned by the hospital as

capital equipment-

On May 23rd, 2001 the plaintiff had a

surgical case scheduled in the LDS operating room.

Dr.

Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff was not allowed to use
either of the two newer microscopes as they were for the
exclusive use of the Defendants and the other members of the
Neurosurgery Division as well as neurosurgery resident
physicians in training.

On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff

sent a letter to Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of
the operative microscope for certain procedures was in the
interests of delivering the highest possible patient care
and that it was also important for patient safety. The
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the use
of operative microscopes and qualified to do so.

The letter

requested Dr. Reichman to change his position as to who he
thought could appropriately use this equipment.
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this
request and instead asserted to the operating room staff

that he had the authority to restrict the use of the
surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery
division and that the Plaintiff was forbidden to use them.
Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, the Chief
of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact owned and
controlled the operating room equipment at LDS Hospital. On
July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with Dr. Doty to discuss
the issue. At this meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that the
surgical microscopes in the LDS Hospital operating rooms
were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it
would be acceptable and appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the
surgical microscopes.
Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash,
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS
Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery department is very
busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are
not available or being used by other services."

This

letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met in
this regard and the opinions are unanimous."

Defendant

Robert Peterson's name is on the letterhead indicating that
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he was acting in concert with Dr. Reichman on this issue.
On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting in
the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal
surgery operation in operating room Five.

Plaintiff was

specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. Robert G. Peterson to
finish his neurosurgical case in that room.

After Dr.

Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the
Plaintiff, a physicians assistant, and a
otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon with whom Dr. Peterson
was friendly with were sitting.

Dr. Peterson had never met

the Plaintiff before this and was therefore unaware of who
he was.

Dr. Peterson began talking to the ENT surgeon.

He

wanted to know if the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for
his case.

He encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the

microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the
Plaintiff, who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure
in Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have
it available for his case.

He went on to state that he,

himself, should "run that scope out" as "a banned surgeon"
was following him in operating room Five.

The Plaintiff

overheard this and responded by going over to the Defendant
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and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems. Also during this time period
both of the Defendant's continued to assert to the operating
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes.

This was a

direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr.
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s).
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes,
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and
operating room time and stress had increased.

Defendants

continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use.

The

signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this
letter.
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and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself

and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems.

Also during this time period

both of the Defendants continued to assert to the operating
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes.

This was a

direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr.
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s).
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes,
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and
operating room time and stress had increased.

Defendants

continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use.

The

signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this
letter.

On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests of
quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical
assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was
necessary.

When the Plaintiff came to the operating room he

was told that Defendants were insistent that he could not
use the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes.

This was

despite the fact that at least one of these microscopes was
available for use on that day as was one of the
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was
located.

Plaintiff asked Dusty Clegg, the operating room

manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion
on how to best handle the problem.

Dusty Clegg recommended

that Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was
unproductive to call hospital administration.

The Plaintiff

called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he wanted to use
one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman had restricted.
Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his
assertion that the Plaintiff did not have Dr. Reichman's
permission to use the microscopes.
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Plaintiff called Dr.

William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central
Region, to explain the situation in brief.

Dr. Hamilton,

after some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in
question.

Plaintiff felt that given the nature of the

surgical procedure, in the interests of patient safety the
case should be cancelled.
The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. Hamilton
requesting information and clarification on what happened
the previous day.

Dr. Hamilton apologized for the outcome

and said that the hospital was dependent on the
neurosurgical service to provide level one trauma care and
also that the hospital was currently in negotiations with
Dr. Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical coverage
for trauma.

He at no time stated that the neurosurgical

division had the authority to restrict access to the
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made
by the Defendants regarding damaged or disassembled
equipment were true or even documented.
B.

ISSUES
1.

Defendant Robert Peterson admits that Utah

11

-\:L

law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh
Carpet

Co. v.

Isom,

Furniture

&

657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).1

Defendant Peterson asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint is
defective because Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant
Peterson intentionally interfered with any of the
Plaintiff's contracts as required under Leigh
The Court in Leigh
ITT Commercial

Furniture

Finance

Corp.3)

Furniture.2

("and similarly in Mum ford

v.

recognized a common-law cause

of action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations, and adopted the Oregon definition of
this tort-4 Under this definition, in order to recover
damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintifffs existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.5 The
Court also noted that privilege is an affirmative defense.6

1
2
3
4
5
6

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement at 2.
Id.
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.
1993)•
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982)
Id,, at 304.
Id.
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The tort of interference with economic relations
is an intentional tort.7

Plaintiff will present evidence

that will show that Defendant's intentionally interfered
with the Plaintiff's existing and potential economic
relations with his patients and their insurance company.
This evidence will include documents and testimony that will
prove that the Defendants wrongfully and unlawfully used
their positions as the providers of neurosurgical services
to LDS Hospital to intimidate the hospital staff and
administration with the specific intent to restrict the
Plaintiff's use of certain equipment.

Plaintiff will

thereby satisfy the intent requirement under Mumford v. ITT
Commercial

Finance

Corp

8

and Leigh

Furniture.9

Plaintiff also intends to prove that the Defendants
made fraudulent and misleading statements in order to
further their goal of interfering with the Plaintiff's
economic relations.

The improper means element in Mumford

is satisfied when "the means used to interfere with a
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as
7

8
9

Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah)
App. 1993).
Id.
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982).

violations of statutes, regulation, or recognized common-law
rules*10

Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves

and hence are clearly * improper' means of interference../'11
"Commonly included among improper means are violence,
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation,
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging
falsehood."12 Means may also be improper or wrongful because
they violate "an established standard of a trade or
profession."13

In the instant case, Defendant's have

interfered with Plaintiff's practice in violation of Utah
Code 58-1-501(2)(a), 58-1-501(2)(b), and 58-67-501(1)(c)(i).
They have also used intimidation and violated standards of
the profession of medicine.

The Plaintiff will prove that

the improper means element is satisfied.
Plaintiff asserts that under certain circumstances
the equipment in question is vital to his economic relations
in that it allows him to provide increased safety and a
higher quality of care to his patients.

10
11
12
13

As a direct result

Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah
App. 1993).
Id.
Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins, Co., 582 P. 2d 1365, 1371
and FN 11 (Oregon 1978).
Id., at 1371.

of the Defendant's interference with the Plaintiff's
economic relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a
surgical case thereby causing economic injury to the
Plaintiff.
2.

Defendant Peterson, in his Motion to Dismiss,

claims that Plaintiff conceded that there was no actual
interference with the Plaintiff's economic relations,14
fact, Plaintiff concedes nothing of the sort-

In

Plaintiff

merely points out that even if a Defendant does not act for
the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but knows
that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a
result of a defendant's action and is a necessary
consequence thereof, the interference is intentional-15
URCP 8(e)(2) provides in part that "[a]

party may set forth

two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses- When two or more statements are
made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
14

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
• the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 2.
15
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah
App. 1993).

insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable
grounds or on both.16

The Plaintiff's Complaint is not

defective on the grounds that he conceded that there was no
actual interference.

Plaintiff's Complaint does not support

this defense.
3,

Defendant Peterson claims that Plaintiff's

pleadings are absent any reasonable inference that Defendant
Peterson committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty
allegedly owed to Dr. Brown.17 The Defendants are partners
sharing various duties and responsibilities in a contractual
relationship-

Additionally, Defendant Reichman has

indicated that his actions and allegations are supported by
all of his partners and his assertions are representative of
all the members of Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C.
Defendant Peterson is a member of Neurosurgical Associates,
L.L.C. and his signature appears on a letter that

17

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 3.

16

fraudulently implies that Plaintiff caused damage to
equipment and delay in patient treatment.

Therefore, any

actions that the Claim charges against Defendant Reichman is
also imputed to Defendant Peterson.

Additionally,

Defendant's actions, including his statements to other
physicians that Plaintiff was a banned surgeon and that the
Defendant should physically remove a vital piece of
equipment from an operating room in order to keep the
Plaintiff from rightfully using that piece of equipment is
consistent with the Plaintiff's allegations of
unprofessional and unlawful behavior.

Plaintiff has stated

claims very particularly and very specifically against both
of the Defendants.
4,

Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Complaint

does not specify how his economic relations were affected or
whether patients were ill served by anything that the
Defendant did or did not do.18

Plaintiff was unwilling to

subject a patient to unnecessary and increased risk by using
an inferior piece of equipment when safer and higher quality
equipment was available.

id. at 4.

Although the equipment was

physically available, the Defendant's wrongful and unlawful
actions directly and indirectly restricted the Plaintiff's
access to this equipment.

Therefore, in the interests of

patient safety and quality of patient care, Plaintiff
canceled a surgical procedure when the Defendant's
interfered with his attempt at fulfilling his obligations
under his contract with IHC Health Plans,

Plaintiff's

Complaint very specifically points out that as a direct
result of the Defendant's interference with his economic
relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a surgical
case,19

The Defendant knew, or should have known that this

result was a likely and necessary consequence of his
actions.

Defendant Peterson is in the business of providing

surgical services to patients.

Defendant Peterson is well

aware of the economic consequences of canceling a scheduled
surgical case.

The claim by Defendant Peterson that there

is no factual allegation that Dr. Peterson intentionally or
otherwise unlawfully caused Plaintiff to not perform any
contract or otherwise interfered with Plaintiff's economic
relations is without merit.

19

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 12.

18

5.

Defendant Peterson has alleged that

Plaintiff's Complaint is defective in that it gives
insufficient particularity regarding damages.20

Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint specifies actual damages as $18,296.50.21
This amount represents the approximate surgical fee for the
cancelled case.
6.

Defendant Peterson alleges that Plaintiff's

Complaint is defective because he has no standing to bring
claims under Utah Code Ann Section 58-1-501 (2) (a), (2)(b),
and 58-67-501(a)(c)(i). Plaintiff is not claiming that he
has standing to bring action based on violations of these
Code Sections.

Plaintiff is merely pointing out that the

Defendants have violated these Code Sections thereby
supporting his claim that the Defendants have improperly (as
defined in Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. 858 P.2d.
1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993)) interfered with his economic
relations.
C.

CONCLUSIONS
1.

URCP 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to

20

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 4.

21

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 15.

19

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is treated as one for summary judgment.
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment
requires that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.22 In a case of motion for
summary judgment by the Defendant, the Plaintiff is
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to him,23

Plaintiff has fairly and

with specificity stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

There are many issues of material fact which

would affect the outcome of this matter and so Plaintiff
respectfully requests that Defendant's motion to dismiss
is denied.
2.

Plaintiff has set forth his claims with

specificity and particularity.

Plaintiff's allegations

are neither vague nor ambiguous.

Plaintiff respectfully

requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion for a
More Definite Statement.
URCP 56(c).
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Dated August 26th, 2002.

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Attorney, acting for himself:
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953)

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 26 , 2002, I caused to be mailed
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Supporting Default
Entry and Against Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Motion
for a More Definite Statement, by first-class United States Mail,
postage prepaid and addressed as follows:

Harold L. Reiser
Attorney for the defendant, Robert Peterson, M.D.
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1500
Bruce H. Jensen
Attorney for the defendant, Mark Reichman
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

AJtan B. Brown

